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Introduction: Why Should Political Theorists Care About Work?  
 
Ben Turner & Lucas Van Milders 
 





Even though the future of work has become a significant public concern, political theory has not yet considered work 
to be a central concept within the discipline. The five papers in this symposium provide a range of perspectives on 
what it means to take work seriously within political thought. This introduction will give an account of why work 
should be considered as important by political theorists, contextualize the broader landscape into which these papers 
intervene (characterized by the issues of automation, precarity, and social reproduction), and situate them within 
existing writing on work within political theory. 
 
 
Work takes up the vast majority of our lives. Despite this fact, work is a topic that has been largely neglected by 
political theorists. This is not simply a problem because of the proportion of our time that it occupies, but because 
work possesses characteristics that are integral to many of the themes of political theory. Commentators who have 
addressed this gap have argued that political theory’s neglect of work means it fails to consider the dominant manner 
in which the obligation to work integrates individuals into “the basic social contract” of liberal democracies.1 If the 
substance of political theory is how these processes of integration are governed, then work should be of central 
importance. Moreover, work plays more than a sociological role. It constitutes a directly political relationship in which 
our choices are governed by others. Although it appears to be part of the public realm, employment is in reality a form 
of “private” government with ensuing trade-offs regarding our freedom.2 Freedom and its relationship to government 
is arguably the bread and butter of much political theory, yet work is absent from most discussions of this relationship. 
It is granted that Marxist and Feminist traditions have indeed considered work as a central element of political thought, 
but the absence of these themes across political theory of all traditions––such as analytical and continental schools 
more broadly––is clear. 
 
This lacuna could be explained as a product of intellectual history. Post-Marxism transformed the class- and thus 
work-based analyses of Marxism into a consideration of the political dynamics of identity beyond class.3 Work loses 
importance as an object of concern for left-wing political thought precisely because it must compete with a variety of 
other concerns that do not map onto the working class as a subject. In a manner similar to and not totally 
distinguishable from post-Marxism, continental political philosophy has largely been concerned with the abstractions 
of post-foundational or post-structural ontological reasoning in order to theorize the changing and fractured nature of 
identity and community over the concrete realities of working life, especially under the auspices of neoliberal modes 
of government.4 This is a concern that arises from a skepticism of authority, and thus of assertive and strictly normative 
politics that one might associate with class and work-based organization, which lies partially in the continental 
tradition’s roots in the 1968 student movements. Liberal egalitarianism––and its considerations of distribution, justice, 
and rights––has focused its attention on the moral principles that underlie the redistribution of goods rather than the 
realities of the market economies that produce the inequalities that they are intended to address.5 Analyses of justice 
without any consideration of work are the product of a long move away from the circumstances of individual lives, as 
figures like Charles W. Mills have claimed.6 Crucially, these circumstances are defined by a range of relationships to 
work. 
 
Times are changing, however. Since the global financial crash of 2007-‘08 and the austerity that followed it––the joint 
consequence of which has been a growth of both inequality and precarity, as well as a growing concern for the impact 
of technological progress on employment that may compound these problems––work has gained traction as a key 
topic of interest. Popular accounts of the potential impact of these developments have proliferated in recent years, 
many of which invoke direct consequences for freedom and democracy.7 Campaigns for a post-work society have 
drawn on these insights to suggest that they present an opportunity to challenge both the necessity of full-time 
employment and the work ethic more generally.8 A four-day working week, variations on a universal basic income, 
and new models of public and worker ownership are common proposals in this area.9 The pressing nature of these 
concerns have been highlighted by responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in the world of work. These indicate both 
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the possibility of radically rethinking how we organize, value, and remunerate work, and the extent to which existing 
inequalities in this sphere are entrenched. Disparities between those who have been able to shift work to a safer setting 
at home and those who have no choice but to work in unsafe conditions are a clear indicator of the deeply political 
nature of work. 
 
Notwithstanding notable exceptions, political theory has generally been slow to respond to these developments by 
integrating work into its central concerns.10 The aim of this symposium is to highlight both why work should be a topic 
of central importance for political theory and how political theory might contribute to contemporary discussions 
regarding the nature and place of work. Crucially, the articles here do not hew to one particular school of thought in 
order to demonstrate the pertinence of work to political theory as a whole. Approaches represented include Feminism, 
Marxism, Republicanism and Decolonial Theory. Less-prominent traditions that have been more attentive to work 
than mainstream political theory are also brought to the fore in order to demonstrate their importance to political theory 
more widely: labor Republicanism, 11  feminist discussions of sex work, 12  and Social Reproduction Theory 13  in 
particular. In what follows, we will outline some of the central influences on, and themes within, the turn to work in 




Automation and its potential impact upon employment is one of the most immediately visible and discussed topics 
concerning the future of work. News publications that have not published on this issue are the exception to a gamut 
of op-eds and analyses of how developments in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and robotics will transform 
the workforce. Commonly repeated narratives on this theme share a concern for the discovery that non-routine and 
cognitive tasks could be performed by machines, in contrast to existing assumptions that only routine and non-
cognitive labor can be automated.15 Consequently, advances in machine learning suggest a massive expansion of the 
number of jobs that could potentially be subject to automation. Job polarization and underemployment (rather than 
unemployment) are perceived to be the consequences of this trend.16 Traditionally middle-class jobs––which involve 
non-manual and non-routine work, but at a relatively low level of complexity––are in danger of being hollowed out, 
leaving a gap between work that is difficult to automate because it requires “high skill” cognitive abilities or “low 
skill” tasks that involve tacit, fiddly, and habitual knowledge. Think of the discrepancy in salary between a successful 
lawyer and a cleaner or service worker; it is the managerial and secretarial work in between these two extremes that 
is most in danger of being eradicated by automation.17 As such, automation is perceived to have the potential to 
overturn the class dynamics of the Western world due to the central role that the middle classes apparently play in 
democratic politics.18 
 
Whether these predictions are realistic or fantastical is somewhat beside the point, given that they have galvanized a 
range of discussions about the nature of work on the basis of their mere possibility. These responses are, somewhat 
unsurprisingly, mixed. As stated, some perceive this as an opportunity to challenge our relationship with work, and to 
use automation to reduce working time and increase the leisure time required for an autonomous and fulfilling life 
beyond capitalism.19 Others are less ambitious, and seek to reconcile automation with existing models of growth and 
employment.20 Both of these positions accept the claim that automation will transform the economy. Skeptics look to 
other causes for pressures on employment, such as low productivity, and see “automation discourse” as missing the 
forest for the trees.21 Whether automation does pose an immediate threat to employment or not, responses to its 
possibility present a rich seam for political theorists to mine insofar as the reflection on work and the changes it might 
bring upon society are revealing of our assumptions about both what should be and what justifies what is. 
 
In the context of automation, thinking about work has consequences for normative discussions that reach beyond the 
immediate realm of employment. The substance of these reflections on work have already been subject to some 
scrutiny in this respect. Most generally, it has been noted that power is absent from many accounts of post-work 
politics. Technology should not be understood as an inexorable, society-changing force, but as dependent upon 
existing relations of power and the normative assumptions behind them.22 Forces of production that are necessary for 
the automation revolution are embedded within global class dynamics and the relations of production that they entail–
a reality which is obscured by techno-utopianism.23 Technological transformation alone will not alter these relations. 
Neither will it disrupt gendered and racialized inequalities without explicit consideration of the relations that underpin 
them.24 For example, images of automated futures can reproduce racial inequalities regarding who should be served 
and who is servile, and the promotion of a universal basic income to respond to technological unemployment will do 
little to address gendered divisions of labor both in the workplace and in the home without thinking about the social 
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basis of these inequalities.25 Political theorists should be attentive to these issues because they require the projection 
of new normative claims regarding work and the unearthing of the assumptions which underlie our existing ones.  
 
One substantive normative commitment that has been rethought in the context of automation is freedom. Recent work 
within Republican political thought has sought to recover the insights of radical and labor republicanism for the 
contemporary place of work. In “Radical Republicanism and the Future of Work,” Tom O’Shea argues that the 
restructuring of the workforce that automation is precipitating provides an occasion to challenge models of work that 
presuppose the subordination of workers. Subordination, or domination, is understood in terms of a worker’s lack of 
economic freedom, i.e. their lack of access to the economic capabilities necessary to stand in relationships of civil 
equality. As a theory that opposes arbitrary power and economic servitude, Republican theory is ideally placed to 
offer ways of resisting the arbitrary (economic) domination of workers. Enhancing worker power through workplace 
organization, providing access to economic goods and services, and enhancing the importance of leisure are but some 
of the potential strategies that emanate from this perspective. Arguing that this applies to paid, productive work as 
well as unpaid, reproductive work, O’Shea concludes that radical Republicanism’s understanding of freedom offers a 
rationale for a reduction of work, which in turn frees up more time and energy for self-development as well as a reason 
for transforming work altogether. 
 
Automation has also prompted reflection on the relation between freedom and work in the home. Gendered forms of 
social reproduction are often taken for granted in post-work imaginaries based on automation, while it is clear that 
automation in the workplace does not necessarily lead to the reduction of work in the home. It is in this context that 
Valeria Graziano and Kim Trogal argue that feminist critiques of domestic technologies ought to be seen as facilitating 
anti-work instead of post-work imaginaries. In “On Domestic Fantasies and Anti-Work Policies: A Feminist History 
of Complicating Automation,” they argue that post-work perspectives typically lack an analysis of the domestic realm 
and thereby ignore the well-known feminist challenge to the arbitrary separation of the public and the private sphere: 
the home is not autonomous from capital. Graziano and Trogal focus their analysis on the notion that automated 
technology is inherently labor-saving. Reflecting on the Taylorization of the housewife and the rationalizing of the 
working-class home, they highlight how the domestic sphere is also subject to the pervasive language of productivity. 
Free time has not facilitated a woman’s own leisure or development, but has instead contributed to the increased 
individualization of work, whereby each housewife was supposed to self-Taylorize and perform all tasks. As an 
alternative, Graziano and Trogal present a radical reading of amateurism, leisure, and hobbies as sites where practices 




One consequence of automation is the fragmentation and disruption of the labor market. Here technological 
development both facilitates and exacerbates the second key concern that motivates a return to the question of work 
in political theory: precarity. Automation and its impact on the workforce exacerbates the ongoing undermining of 
secure employment by precarious forms of work, which is defined as follows: 
 
Precarious work is best defined as the absence of those aspects of the standard employment relationship (SER) that 
support the decommodification of labor…the essence of the SER is found not in its habitual form of full-time permanent 
work but in its substantive protections against a pure market relationship, jointly provided by employers and the state 
through employment rights and social protection…Precarious work, in contrast, is associated with low pay, insufficient 
and variable hours, short-term contracts and limited social protection rights. These characteristics are frequently found 
in, but not confined to, what are known as non-standard forms of employment (NSFE), including part-time, temporary 
and zero hours contracts and dependent self-employment.26 
 
A word of caution is necessary here. Precarious forms of work are not new. Vulnerability to precarious work has 
always been a pressing issue for those falling on the “wrong side” of how the labor market is carved up, particular in 
terms of race, gender or migration status.27 Moreover, attention to precarity within the Western world should be 
situated with respect its place in a global history of insecure employment and dispossession by capital.28 In this respect 
secure employment is an historical exception rather than a norm from which we have only recently deviated. What is 
new however, is the expansion of the employment practices that have underpinned precarious work to hitherto “stable” 
areas of employment traditionally occupied by the white middle classes29––to the extent that some have defined the 




Such a claim is made in response to several aspects of precariousness, of which we highlight two key developments. 
First, standard employment relationships have not only been replaced by non-standard forms of employment but 
precarious forms of employment practices have become a regular aspect of standard employment. From the 1970s 
onwards, increased precarity has resulted from neoliberal transformations within Western economies that have shifted 
power from labor to capital.31 In other words, precarity in the realm of work is a product of the employment practices 
specific to neoliberalism as a regime of capital accumulation. As a reinstitution of class war against labor, 
neoliberalism leverages government against labor by deregulating employment in order to facilitate flexibility in 
production and push down costs, particularly those associated with standard employment relationships. Another 
reason why political theorists should pay attention to work, then, is that precarity represents a relationship between 
employment and governance that supersedes one characterized by the exchange of obedience for protection.32 This 
highlights the extent to which the problem of liberty is at stake in the employment relationship insofar as it is one of 
private government and certainly one in which the employee has little power in the majority of cases.33 
 
Precarity does not simply hold power over individuals with respect to their employment. Existing work has highlighted 
a second development that is central to precarity: it expands well beyond the employment relationship, insofar as 
precarious work puts pressures on personal, familial, and household life. In an employment environment dominated 
by precarity, success becomes available to those that can adopt an entrepreneurial mindset in order to navigate a range 
of, sometimes simultaneously, insecure, temporary, and low-wage contracts.34 A central pillar of neoliberalism is this 
personal responsibility. You, and not the state, are responsible for your ability to compete with others in order to work 
and provide for yourself and your dependents.35 Those that cannot do so are forced to fall back upon other solutions 
such as payday loans to bridge the gap between paychecks. Precarity at work is thus linked to a more generalized state 
of precarity represented by the financialization of everyday life that is characterized by the centrality of debt to 
economic survival.36 Changes to secure forms of employment are integrated within wider relationships between 
precarity and the state, individuals, and social expectations regarding work.  
 
It should be noted that precarity has been subject to criticism due to its nebulous character. It describes a huge range 
of human experience and is as such considered by some to be conceptually diffuse.37 Regardless of this, precarity is 
still important for highlighting the significance of work to political theorists. As a concept, precarity at least attempts 
to capture a set of transformations in the world of work that have significant consequences for themes that are common 
objects of attention for political theorists. Deregulation of the labor market represents the state’s active role in 
determining the nature of employment relationships, and thus the nature of private government. Precarity transforms 
the way in which individuals encounter the state through its regulation of work, but also the power relationships that 
constitute private governance. The power to voice one’s disagreement and to exit a relationship of private governance 
are negated if that employment is precarious. Political theorists would do well to ask how precarity as a particular 
regime of work is pertinent to common concerns of political thought, such as justice, equality, and liberty. 
 
However, as mentioned above, precarity is nothing new. It can and should be related to existing relations of colonial 
and racial violence. In “Precarity/Coloniality,” Lucas Van Milders retraces the colonial histories and realities that 
continue to structure discussions and experiences of precarity today. This is related to the racialized and gendered 
nature of precarity as well as the fact that its discussion has become widespread at the exact moment that precaritization 
has captured the once-privileged subject of colonial subjugation and capitalist extraction: the middle-class, white male. 
Most importantly, the whiteness of precarity continues to structure popular post-work imaginaries that are steeped in 
Western experiences and narratives. Drawing on Autonomist anti-work resistances in the form of Autonomia and 
Zapatismo, Van Milders concludes that discussions on the future of work will maintain their relevance and efficacy 
only by critically reflecting on the role that colonial and racial violence plays in shaping and maintaining experiences 
of precarity today. 
 
Reproduction, Care, and Sex Work 
 
Automation has the potential to transform the nature of employment and precarity is seen to have already wrought 
significant changes upon standard employment relationships. Consequently, the changing nature of work provides the 
opportunity for hitherto fringe considerations of neglected forms of work to be brought to the center of political theory. 
These are forms of labor that have been deemed as unproductive and therefore not truly work (such as care labor) and 
those that are not seen to be morally justifiable and therefore cannot be sanctioned as labor (such as sex-work).38 
Social reproduction theorists have long criticized the distinction between so called productive employment and private 
care labor in the home. While care work is not directly “productive,” insofar as it does not produce surplus value, 
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without the reproduction of the worker and the social structures that facilitate their ability to work, there is no 
production of surplus value. Care work is thus directly implicated within the process of accumulation and is as much 
a site of exploitation as the workplace.39 Precisely how care work is implicated in the production of surplus value is a 
contentious question, however a point shared by social reproduction theorists is that it is a neglected area of the analysis 
of the politics of labor.40  
 
Expanding and drawing upon the wages-for-housework activism of feminist movements in the ‘70s, attention to social 
reproduction brings gender to the center of the political theory of work. There are two reasons for this. First, it 
highlights the way in which a gendered division of labor is integral to, rather than a mere epiphenomenon of, current 
conceptualizations of work. As Silvia Federici summarizes, the ideology of work mobilized by capital requires this 
naturalization of female care labor: 
 
The difference with housework lies in the fact that not only has it been imposed on women, but it has been transformed 
into a natural attribute of our female physique and personality, an internal need, an aspiration, supposedly coming from 
the depth of our female character. Housework was transformed into a natural attribute, rather than being recognized as 
work, because it was destined to be unwaged. Capital had to convince us that it is a natural, unavoidable, and even 
fulfilling activity to make us accept working without a wage.41 
 
Second, it draws our attention to how changes in the realm of work exert pressure upon this particular division of 
labor. It is unlikely that automation or other technological developments will substantially alleviate the burden of 
housework on their own.42 Feminists have long argued that technology does not alleviate “domestic drudgery in any 
straightforward way.”43 Similarly, precarity and downward pressure on wages have made the need for two-income 
households more pressing while the gendered division of labor in the home has largely stayed the same.44 A rise in 
women joining the public workforce has been facilitated by precarious labor performing care labor as a service. This 
is not a new phenomenon; care labor as a service has long been racialized and performed by those at the sharp end of 
precarity.45 Moreover, injustices and inequities that are distributed along racial lines are compounded by the dual 
caring burden of the care-worker-mother.46 Racialized and gendered relations of power have been at the center of 
much critical political theory, and the consideration of care work within social reproduction theory provides another 
avenue to pursue these analyses.47 
 
The gendered dynamics of care labor are also present within considerations of sex work. Sex work’s place as an object 
of concern for feminists is a vexed issue.48 For some, sex work is simply part of patriarchal control over women’s 
lives and bodies.49 For others, the refusal to see sex work as a legitimate form of labor prevents a consideration of how 
this form of work involves a unique set of intersecting forces––such as race, gender, and sexuality––which combine 
to create distinct forms of both freedom and oppression.50 If choices to engage in sex work are contextualized within 
the economic and social conditions that inform these decisions (as opposed to simply oppression), then it can be 
understood as a particular form of work that is subject to pressures that might render it as oppressive without it 
necessarily being so.51 Insofar as such choices, or indeed their absence, are informed by economic inequalities, 
hierarchies, and gendered and racialized power relations, sex work should be understood as a specific form of work 
in which these pressures converge in a particular manner, but also as subject to pressures that are present in all work 
in some form.52 Consequently, through a consideration of sex work, political theorists might gain access to hitherto 
fringe discussions about the nature of power, freedom, and oppression and how these issues inform the choices 
individuals make about the forms of work that they choose to engage in. 
 
Social reproductive labor and sex work are of importance to the political theorist because they allow both for an 
expanded understanding of the forms that work might take, as well as the exertion of, and challenges to, power 
relations that might exist in what have hitherto been considered as fringe realms of work relations. Moreover, accounts 
of justice in political theory often hinge upon the question of how to properly address injustices, and give a voice to 
those suffering from them, if they are not immediately visible. If care work and sex work have been rendered 
“invisible” by conceptualizations of work that exclude labor perceived as unproductive or morally unacceptable, then 
the task of making the problems of these forms of work visible falls under the auspices of considerations of justice.53 
This insight, drawn from accounts of socially reproductive labor and sex work, applies beyond these realms of work. 
What we define as valuable labor has an impact on what kinds of work are “visible” and “invisible” to the political 




One such form of invisible, or at least unclearly defined, form of labor is intellectual production. The nature of the co-
option of indirectly productive labor is at stake in David Bates’s discussion of the exploitation of academic work in 
“Academic Labor and its Exploitation.” Bates inquires into the character of the exploitation of academic labor if it is 
not considered directly productive and is therefore in some way “invisible.” By way of a discussion of Marxist debates 
regarding membership of the working class and the source of value, Bates argues that academic labor should be 
considered as a form of mediated production. It is not directly productive of surplus value but mobilizes caring and 
affective labor in order to indirectly produce value through the training of future workers. Insofar as academic work 
that is beyond measure is subjected to the rule of measure, and therefore the source of surplus value, it can be 
considered as exploited. 
 
It is, in the end, through discussions of neglected forms of work that we can get a better sense of why it matters that a 
given activity is defined as work or not, and what this indicates about the meaning of work itself. This claim is central 
to Amelia Horgan’s contribution. In “Creeping and Ameliorative Accounts of ‘Work’,” Horgan argues that claiming 
an activity as work can change the meaning of work. By looking at sex work and emotional labor, Horgan clarifies 
how feminist theory has contributed to the reconceptualization of work as both a social and legal institution and a 
terrain of social meaning. These accounts of work allow us to get a better sense of the plurality of individual 
experiences of work as they foreground the complicated relationship between exploitation and conscious activity 
rather than unproblematically accepting any one critical or laudatory definition of work. Work is a category that is 
fundamentally pluralist in Horgan’s view. 
 
It is this pluralism that this collection seeks to foster. Political theorists should not be urged to consider work as part 
of their broader theoretical concerns in any one particular manner. Instead, the diversity of ways in which work can 
be defined and the range of issues in which it appears as a concern––such as automation, precarity, and care and sex 
work––suggest that it would be intellectually unproductive to stipulate precisely what work is and why it poses 
pressing theoretical questions. It is the contention of this symposium that approaching work from a range of theoretical 
perspectives, as do the pieces included here, is central for developing how political theory as a discipline might address 
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